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STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE ST JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT
) SS:
COUNTY OF ST JOSEPH ) CRIMINAL DIVISION
STATE OF INDIANA )
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) CAUSE NO: 71D04-2512-MH-000134
)
MIKE HAZE )
Defendant. )

DEFENDANT’S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

Introduction
Defendant, Mike Haze, by counsel Matthew J. Anderson, respectfully submits this Memorandum
in Support of his Motion to Dismiss. The charge pending against him arises from a traffic stop
that was unlawful at its inception and unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. Indiana Code § 9-21-7-2 did not require the use of headlights at 5:00 p.m. on
November 24, 2025, nineteen minutes before sunset, and in clear daylight conditions. Because
no traffic infraction existed, Officer Jackson lacked lawful authority to stop Defendant’s vehicle.
Even if the Court were to credit the initial stop as lawful, the officer’s decision to prolong the
encounter for twenty-five minutes without new reasonable suspicion violated controlling federal
and Indiana precedent. All resulting evidence must be suppressed, and once excluded, the State
is left without admissible evidence to sustain prosecution. Dismissal is therefore required.

Statement of Facts
On November 24, 2025, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Officer Micah Jackson initiated a traffic
stop of Defendant’s vehicle for allegedly operating without headlights. Sunset, however, did not
occur that day until 5:19 p.m., and Officer Jackson reported no visibility concerns, weather
issues, or impairment to roadway sightlines. Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Jackson did
not observe any indicators of intoxication. Defendant exhibited no odor of alcohol, no slurred
speech, no balance disturbance, and no erratic driving behavior. Defendant complied fully with
requests for documentation and simply declined to answer alcohol-related questions, as is his
constitutional right. Although Defendant appeared nervous and occasionally looked backward at
the officer, such conduct is ordinary during police encounters and does not suggest criminal
activity or impairment. Despite the absence of any displays of intoxication, Officer Jackson
detained Defendant for approximately twenty-five minutes before performing field sobriety
testing. Officer Jackson later confirmed that his only reason for prolonging the detention was
Defendant’s nervous demeanor, not any new objective facts suggesting impairment.

Argument
The initial stop and the prolonged detention violated both Indiana statutory requirements and
constitutional protections under the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana
Constitution. The officer lacked lawful authority to initiate the stop because headlights were not
required under Indiana Code § 9-21-7-2 at the time of the encounter. Even assuming the initial
stop was lawful, the twenty-five-minute extension lacked reasonable suspicion and violated
established federal and Indiana law. Because all evidence was developed from this unlawful
seizure, suppression is mandatory, leaving the State without admissible proof. Dismissal is
therefore the proper legal remedy.

I. The Initial Stop Was Unlawful Because Indiana Code § 9-21-7-2 Did Not Require
Headlights at the Time of the Stop.
Indiana Code § 9-21-7-2 requires headlights only between sunset and sunrise or when visibility
is so poor that a vehicle or person cannot be seen at a distance of 500 feet. Sunset on November
24, 2025, occurred at 5:19 p.m., nineteen minutes after the stop. Visibility was clear, and no
environmental factor triggered the statute. Headlight operation, therefore, was not legally
mandated.
Indiana courts require that officers reasonably believe a traffic law was violated before initiating
a seizure. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 870–72 (Ind. 2009) confirms that traffic stops must
rest on an actual violation or articulable suspicion. Likewise, State v. Keck, 4 N.E.3d 1180,
1183–84 (Ind. 2014) holds that an officer’s misunderstanding of the traffic code cannot justify
detention.
Because Indiana Code § 9-21-7-2 did not apply at 5:00 p.m. and visibility was clear, Officer
Jackson misapplied the statute. A traffic stop without statutory authority violates both the Fourth
Amendment and Article 1, Section 11.
Evidence obtained from an unlawfully initiated stop must be suppressed. In State v. Renzulli, 958
N.E.2d 1143, 1148–49 (Ind. 2011), the Indiana Supreme Court held that suppression is required
when the stop itself lacks a lawful basis. All field sobriety observations and testing in this case
must therefore be excluded.

II. The Twenty-Five-Minute Detention Violated Rodriguez and Controlling Indiana
Precedent.
Even assuming the initial stop was lawful, the twenty-five-minute detention violated
constitutional limits. Under Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 357–58 (2015), a lawful
traffic stop becomes unlawful when prolonged beyond the time necessary to complete the stop’s
mission unless new objective facts provide reasonable suspicion.
Indiana courts adopt the same rule. In Wilson v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1064, 1067–68 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006), the Court held that prolonging a stop without reasonable suspicion violates the Fourth
Amendment. In State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1152–53 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), evidence was
suppressed where police extended a completed traffic stop without a legal basis.
Officer Jackson observed no signs of impairment: no odor of alcohol, no slurred speech, no
unsteady movements, no confusion, and no erratic driving. The investigation was extended
solely because the Defendant appeared nervous. Because no new evidence developed during the
stop, the extension lacked the reasonable suspicion required under Rodriguez, Wilson, and Gray.
All evidence produced after the extension was obtained through unconstitutional detention.

III. Nervousness Alone Cannot Establish Reasonable Suspicion Under Indiana Law.
The officer extended the stop because the Defendant appeared nervous. Indiana courts repeatedly
reject nervousness as a basis for reasonable suspicion. In State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200,
1205–06 (Ind. 2008), the Supreme Court held that nervous behavior—even if pronounced—is
typical during police encounters and cannot justify continued detention.
Likewise, Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598–99 (Ind. 2008), confirms that nervous conduct
does not transform a lawful stop into reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify prolonging
detention. Since Officer Jackson identified no corroborating indicators of impairment,
nervousness alone cannot justify the twenty-five-minute extension.

IV. All Evidence Obtained After Unlawful Detention Must Be Suppressed, and Without It
the State Cannot Prove Its Case.
Evidence obtained through unconstitutional law enforcement activity must be excluded.
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. at 357–58; State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d at 1152–53; and
State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1148–49 demonstrate that suppression is mandatory where
detention violates constitutional protections.
The State’s case relies entirely on field-sobriety observations and testing performed only after
prolonged detention. Because these observations occurred following unconstitutional detention,
none are admissible.
Under the exclusionary rule, the State may not use unlawfully obtained evidence to meet its
burden; without admissible proof, the State cannot carry its prosecutorial obligation. See also
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–88 (1963).
Without admissible evidence, the State cannot establish probable cause or meet its burden of
proof. Dismissal is therefore the only lawful result.

Conclusion and Request for Relief
The initial stop violated Indiana law because headlights were not required before sunset, and
visibility was clear. The prolonged detention violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1,
Section 11 because it was based on nothing more than ordinary nervous behavior and lacked
reasonable suspicion. All resulting evidence must be suppressed. If the evidence is inadmissible,
the State cannot proceed, and dismissal is legally required. After suppression, no admissible
evidence remains to support the charge. Without evidence, further prosecution cannot proceed as
a matter of law.

WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant the Motion to Dismiss,
suppress all evidence following the unlawful stop and detention, and grant all other just and
proper relief.

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Matthew J. Anderson
Matthew J. Anderson
Attorney No. 23595-84
Counsel for Defendant
May • Oberfell • Lorber, LLP
4100 Edison Lakes Parkway, Suite 100
Mishawaka, IN 46545
Phone: (574) 243-4100
Email: MJA@mayoberfelllorber.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 20th day of December 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was served upon the following by
electronic service through the Court’s E-Filing System, or, if not applicable, by U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid:

Office of the Prosecuting Attorney
St. Joseph County Prosecutor’s Office
227 W. Jefferson Blvd.
South Bend, Indiana 46601
Matthew J. Anderson
Counsel for Defendant

Class assignment

Written by: Greg MD